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NOTES
Gregory v. Ashcroft: The Plain Statement Rule and Judicial
Supervision of Federal-State Relations
Appointed state judges throughout the country may still feel the
sting of the Supreme Court's decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft Iupholding
Missouri's mandatory retirement age for these judges.2 The Court's refusal to extend the protection of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) 3 to appointed state judges will have a significant impact on
Congress as well. In Gregory the Court placed a new burden on Congress to state clearly its intent to extend federal statutes to certain state
and local governmental functions.4 Because the Court first implemented
this requirement to interpret a federal statute enacted under the Commerce Clause,5 Gregory represents a Court willing to turn to statutory
construction as a means to monitor federal-state relations.6
The ADEA provides: "[I]t shall be unlawful for an employer to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."7
Employers, therefore, may not impose mandatory retirement ages on employees covered by the ADEA.8 The Supreme Court in Gregory declined
to extend the ADEA's protection to appointed state judges, 9 however,
1. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
4. To support this requirement, the Court relied on the plain statement rule. See infra
text accompanying notes 36-37. Before Gregory, the Court only used the plain statement rule
to determine whether Congress intended a federal statute to apply to the states at all. See infra
notes 125-35, 152-58 and accompanying text.
5. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 235-44 (1983) (finding that the extension of the
ADEA to the states was a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
6. Prior to Gregory, the Court held that the judiciary should play no principal role in
supervising the scope of Commerce Clause legislation as it applied to state and local governments. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
8. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 410 (1985) ("[P]olicies and
substantive provisions of the [ADEA] apply with especial force in the case of mandatory retirement provisions.").
9. State judges may be elected or appointed. Gregory addressed the question whether the
ADEA's protection extends to appointed state judges. See Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2398.
Elected state judges fall within the exclusion for "persons] elected to public office" and are,
therefore, expressly excluded from the ADEA's protection. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f). For the full
text of the relevant statutory language, see infra note 11.
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because Congress failed to state with sufficient clarity its intention to in-

clude them within the Act's coverage.10 Now, states may force their

judges to retire notwithstanding Congress's intent to extend the ADEA

to all employees, with four narrowly defined exceptions.1"
To support its holding a majority of five justices relied on its so-

called "plain statement rule." 12 This rule, as previously interpreted by
the Court, requires that when a federal statute alters the balance of
power between the states and federal government, Congress must state
clearly its intent to extend the statute to the states."1 In Gregory, however, the Court required more than an expression of Congress's clear and
unequivocal intent to extend the ADEA to the states. The majority required Congress to state clearly and specifically its intention to extend
the ADEA to appointed state judges, finding that such an extension

would limit a state's Tenth Amendment power to determine the qualifications of its governmental officials. 14
The majority's modified use of the plain statement rule thus requires
that, when a federal statute seeks to regulate traditional state and local
governmental functions, Congress must state clearly the precise applica10. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2404; see infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
11. Section 630(f) of the ADEA excludes certain classes of persons from the Act's antidiscrimination protections:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by any employer except that
the term "employee" shall not include [1] any person elected to public office in any
State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or [2] any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or [3] an appointee
on the policymaking level or [4] an immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of
the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision.
29 U.S.C. § 630(f).
12. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2401, 2406.
13. For a more detailed discussion of the plain statement rule, see infra notes 125-35, 15258 and accompanying text. Congress amended the Act in 1974 to extend the ADEA to the
states, see infra note 91 and accompanying text, and nine years later the Supreme Court held
that the extension of the ADEA to the states was a valid exercise of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 235-44 (1983); see also Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the ADEA may be
extended to state officials because the statute satisfies the plain statement requirement). The
statutory language satisfying this plain statement requirement provides: "The term 'employer'
means... a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a
State or a political subdivision of a State .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 34-37. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X; see
also infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text (outlining the Court's "political-function"
cases, which recognize the states' power to determine the qualifications of their governmental
officeholders).
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tions of the statute. This reliance on the plain statement rule to require
Congress to specify the exact details of a statute's application within the
statute itself is unprecedented. 15
This novel use of the plain statement rule signals the Court's increasing willingness to protect states from the reach of federal statutes,
especially statutes passed pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause powers.1 6 Prior to Gregory, the Court rejected a judicial role in monitoring
the scope of Commerce Clause power as it applied to state and local
governments, forcing states to look to the political process, and not to the
courts, for protection from congressional intrusion.17 Now, through the
use of the plain statement rule, courts may circumvent this self-imposed
limitation on judicial review of Commerce Clause legislation by first determining whether Congress has clearly stated its intent to extend a statute to a particular governmental activity before turning the issue over to
the political process. The Court's new use of the plain statement rule
allows the Court to oversee the extension of Commerce Clause legislation
to'a state's government functions without overruling prior case law limiting its role in this area.
This Note examines Gregory's relationship to prior Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the ADEA and to cases utilizing the plain statement rule.1" The Note concludes that, in requiring Congress to state
clearly the precise application of its statutes, the majority extended the
plain statement rule beyond what existing case law warranted and
reached a result that conflicts with the legislative history and purpose of
the ADEA. 19 By failing to explain how its new use of the plain statement rule might apply in other situations, the Court left the lower federal
courts without a clear test for reviewing congressional legislation of state
and local governmental activities.20
Four Missouri state judges brought this case against the Governor
of the state in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, alleging that a mandatory retirement provision of the Missouri
15. See Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2409 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment).
16. Congress extended the ADEA to the states pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 602, 607
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988)), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat.
189, 189 (1978) (raising upper limit of statute's applicability to age 70), repealed by Pub. L.
No. 99-592, § (2)(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (1986) (eliminating upper-age limit).
17. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985). For a
discussion of Garcia, see infra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 125-35, 152-58 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
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Constitution z" violated the ADEA2 2 and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The district court granted the Governor's
motion to dismiss, holding that judges are not protected by the terms of
the ADEA, since they fall within an exception for "appointees... on a
'policymaking level.' "24 The court also found that the mandatory retirement provision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because there
was a rational basis for distinguishing between such high-level policymaking officials as judges and other state officials.2 5 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding
that Missouri's appointed state judges exercise policymaking responsibilities and that no reason exists for distinguishing between appointed and
elected state judges.26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,2 7 and a

seven-justice majority also affirmed, holding that appointed state judges
come within the exceptions enumerated in the ADEA2 8 and that the

mandatory retirement rule for judges does not violate the anti-discrimination mandate in the Fourteenth Amendment.29 Justice O'Connor,

writing for the majority,30 acknowledged the importance of the federal

constitutional scheme of dual sovereignty between the states and the fed-

eral government, noting that the principal benefit of such a system is the
check on abuses of governmental power it provides."a Yet she recognized
21. The Missouri Constitution provides that "[a]ll judges other than municipal judges
shall retire at the age of seventy years." Mo. CONST. art. V, § 26.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
23. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent
part: "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
24. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2398. For relevant text of the statute, see supra note 11.
25. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2398. The rational relation test used by the district court is the
more lenient of two major standards of review for state action challenged as discriminatory
under the Equal Protection Clause. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
26. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 602-04 (8th Cir. 1990), aff'd, Ill S. Ct. 2395
(1991). Elected state judges are excluded expressly from coverage under the ADEA. See
supra note 11.
27. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S.Ct. 507 (1990).
28. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2404; see supra note 11.
29. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2408.
30. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion. See id. at 2398.
31. Id. at 2399. The Court outlined several other advantages preserved to the people
under such a system of dual sovereignty: assurance of a decentralized government that is more
sensitive to the needs of the people; increased opportunity for citizen involvement in the democratic process; more innovation and experimentation in government; and a more responsive
government. Id. (citing Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluatingthe Founders'Design,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Deborah J. Merritt, The GuaranteeClause and
State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1988)).

19921

AGE DISCRIMINATION

1567

that the Supremacy Clause32 gives the federal government a decided advantage over the states in maintaining the proper balance between federal
and state power.3 3 Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Tenth Amendment provides the states authority to determine the standards their most
important officers must meet,3 4 and stressed that interpreting an ambiguous congressional statute as interfering with the states' ability to determine the qualifications of their judges would upset traditional rules of
federalism.3 5 Employing the plain statement rule, set forth in earlier
cases construing congressional statutes passed pursuant to the Eleventh
and Fourteenth Amendments, 6 the Court required Congress to state explicitly its intention to extend the coverage of the ADEA to appointed
state judges in order for federal courts to find that such intention exists.37
The majority declined to consider the legislative history of the
ADEA and the similar Title VII statute, even though it admitted that the
language of the ADEA was "at least ambiguous" as to whether the statute was intended to cover appointed state judges. 38 Its only reference to
congressional intent was a single admission that the phrase "'appointee[s] at [sic] the policymaking level'.., is an odd way for Congress
to exclude judges" from coverage of the ADEA. 39 Notwithstanding this
admission, the Court proceeded to find that Congress's failure to explicitly include judges4° created an ambiguity sufficient to conclude that they
32. U.S. CONST. Art. VI,

33. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2400.
34. Id. at 2402.
35. Id. at 2401.
36. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
37. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2401.
38. Id. at 2404. The Court attributed the ambiguity to the breadth of the exceptions to
the ADEA. Id.; see also infra note 101 (summarizing the available legislative history of the
ADEA).
39. Gregory, 111 S.Ct at 2404 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)). But see EEOC v. Vermont,
904 F.2d 794, 800-01 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that policymaking is not a traditional judicial
function); 87-8 Op. Vt. Att'y Gen. 4 (1987) (concluding that judges are not ordinarily policymakers but are generally confined to reviewing the policy decisions of others); EEOC Opinion
Letter on Applicability of Age Discrimination in Employment Act to Appointed State Court
Judges, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) N:1001 n.2 (Apr. 7, 1987) [hereinafter EEOC Opinion
Letter] (finding that judges are not policymakers and are, therefore, protected by the ADEA);
SAM J. ERVIN, JR. & RAMSEY CLARK, ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT: POLICYMAKER OR

ADJUDICATOR 8 (1970) (concluding that judges possess interpretative, not policymaking,

powers).
40. Gregory, 111 S.Ct at 2404. The Court did not extend the plain statement rule so far
as to require that the Act explicitly mention judges before protection would be found. Id.
Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that "it must be plain to anyone reading the Act that it
covers judges." Id. The Court concluded that the ADEA statute failed in this respect. Id.
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41

are not covered.
After determining that the ADEA's protection did not extend to
appointed state judges, the Court relied on the plain statement rule to
find that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause also affords state judges no protection.4' Although recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, contemplates interference with state
authority,43 the Court noted that "the States' power to define the qualifications of their officeholders has force even as against the proscriptions of
the Fourteenth Amendment,"' and that judicial scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause "will not be so demanding where we deal with
matters resting firmly within a state's constitutional prerogatives." 45
The plain statement rule, as used to construe statutes under the
Fourteenth Amendment, requires Congress to state clearly its intent to
impose obligations on the states whenever the legislation "intrudes on
traditional state authority. '46 Finding the language of the statute "at

least ambiguous" on the question whether Congress intended the ADEA
to cover state judges,47 the Court held that the necessary congressional
48
intent was absent.
The Court then turned to the Missouri judges' argument that their
exclusion from ADEA violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, notwithstanding Congress's failure to extend the statute's
protection to judges. The petitioners asserted that even if Congress, by
not exercising its power under section five of the Fourteenth Amend-

41. Id.
42. Id. at 2405-06. In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), the Court did not address
the questions whether Congress also extended the ADEA to the states pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers and whether the extension would have been a valid exercise of that
power. Id. at 243 & n.18; see U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5. Without deciding this issue, the
Gregory Court proceeded to find that Congress did not act pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers to extend the ADEA protection to appointed state judges. See Gregory, 111 S.
Ct. at 2405-06.
43. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2405. The Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power
to enforce its prohibition against state action denying equal protection of the laws. See US.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.")
44. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2405.
45. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied most heavily on what it termed its
"political-function" cases. Id.; see infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
46. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2405. The Court relied on Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), in which it first adopted the rule that congressional intent to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner which might intrude upon traditional state
authority must be stated clearly. See id. at 15-16. For a discussion of Pennhurst, see infra
notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
47. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2406.
48. Id.
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ment,4 9 could be deemed to have excluded judges from the ADEA's cov-

erage, such an interpretation would violate the Equal Protection Clause
because no rational basis could exist for distinguishing judges from other
persons protected by the statute.5 0 The Court first acknowledged that, in

accordance with its now well-developed equal protection jurisprudence,
the judges correctly asserted their constitutional challenge under the ra-

tional basis theory, since age is not a suspect classification51 and since the
judges had no fundamental interest in serving on the bench.5 2 Neverthe-

less, the Court dismissed their argument, finding that the mandatory retirement provision is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.53
The Court explained that "[ilt is an unfortunate fact of life that physical
and mental capacity sometimes diminishes with age,"' 54 and noted that
"the people of Missouri have a legitimate, indeed compelling, interest in
maintaining a judiciary fully capable of performing the demanding tasks
that judges must perform." 55 The Court found mandatory retirement a

reasonable response to such a dilemma because other alternatives for removal, such as voluntary retirement or impeachment, may be
56
inadequate.
The Court also found a rational basis for distinguishing between
49. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
50. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2406.
51. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized that certain "discrete and insular minorities"
merit special protection because they have experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" and have been isolated from the political process. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,28 (1973). Suspect class status has been granted to alienage, Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), and
national origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). The Court, however,
has repeatedly found that age is not a suspect classification. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
52. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2406; see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34 (holding that a fundamental right exists only if the right is explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution).
Some fundamental rights recognized by the Supreme Court are the right to marry, Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398 (1978); the right to privacy, including the right to have an abortion
through the second trimester of pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973); the
right to vote, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 140-44 (1972); and the right to engage in interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
53. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2406.
54. Id. at 2407.
55. Id. (citing Vance, 440 U.S. at 111-12, and Murgia, 427 U.S. at 315).
56. Id. The Court noted that these other mechanisms designed to remove judges from
office once their physical or mental capacity started to diminish may not serve as adequate
checks on judges whose performance is deficient. Id. The Court reasoned that the election
process may be inadequate for removal because it may be difficult for the voters to discover the
deficiencies of judges. Id. Many voters never observe state judges in action or read judicial
opinions. Id. State judges also serve longer terms of office than other public officials and most
judges do not run in ordinary elections. Id.
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judges and state officials not subject to the mandatory retirement provision.5 7 The majority noted that other public officials are subjected to
greater public scrutiny through the electoral process.5 8 Deterioration in
performance is more readily discernible in such officials, and they are
more easily removed from office.59
The Court acknowledged that a mandatory retirement provision is
founded on a generalization, and that not all judges subjected to the
mandatory retirement provision will suffer a significant decline in performance once they turn seventy." The Court emphasized, however,
that a state does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because
its classifications are imperfect, 1 and that the people of a state have the
prerogative to establish the qualifications of their judges.62 Accordingly,
the Court found that the people of Missouri made a rational choice in
determining these qualifications, and refused to read either the ADEA or
the Equal Protection Clause so as to take that choice away.63
Justice White, in a separate opinion that Justice Stevens joined, concurred with the majority's finding that state judges are exempt from coverage under the ADEA and that a rational basis exists for requiring
judges to retire at the age of seventy, but strongly criticized the majority's modified use of the plain statement rule to determine that the
ADEA does not apply to judges.64 Justice White contended that the majority had misapplied prior case law involving the plain statement rule
and, in fact, had used its modified rule to bypass earlier decisions limiting
its ability to review statutes passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause.6
Justice White first disagreed with the majority's reliance on the
Court's Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment cases that employed its
plain statement rule.6 6 The issue in the Eleventh Amendment cases "was
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 (1976)).
62. Id. at 2408.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2408-14 (White, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part, and concurring in
judgment).
65. Id. at 2408-11 (White, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part, and concurring in
judgment). For a discussion of the relationship between Gregory and prior plain statement
cases, see infra notes 106-22 and accompanying text.
66. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 69 (1989) (finding no clear
legislative intent to extend 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the states); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985) (applying the plain statement rule to find no clear legislative intent to
override Eleventh Amendment guarantee of state sovereign immunity); Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1981) (applying plain statement rule to determine
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whether Congress intended a particular statute to extend to the States at
6 7 Justice White reminded the majority that,
all."1
in amending the
ADEA, Congress expressly extended coverage to the States. 8 Likewise,
the Fourteenth Amendment case of PennhurstState School di Hospitalv.
Halderman (Pennhurst1)69 only addressed whether a particular statute
was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 70 By contrast, in
Gregory the Court used its modified version of the plain statement rule to
determine the precise applications of a federal statute after Congress
properly extended the statute to the states. 7 1 Justice White then contended that the majority erred in relying on the Court's "political function" cases, which recognize a state's ability to determine the
qualifications of its most important governmental officials, to support its
extension of the plain statement rule to Gregory.7 2 White noted that the
political-function exception merely creates a standard of reduced judicial
scrutiny for states that exclude aliens from certain political functions. 3
These cases, Justice White argued, should not be used as a method for
whether Congress intended to act pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers); see infra
notes 125-35, 152-58 and accompanying text.
67. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2409 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment); see also infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text (outlining the use
of the plain statement rule in these cases).
68. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2409 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment); see supra text accompanying note 13.
69. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
70. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2411-12 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment) (citingPennhurst1, 451 U.S. at 16); see infra notes 152-58 and accompanying text. Justice White pointed out that the requirement in Pennhurst I that Congress
state expressly its intention to act pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause is very different
from the Gregory majority's apparent holding that, even when Congress acts pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, it nevertheless must state specifically the precise application of its
legislation. Gregory, I11 S. Ct. at 2411-12 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in judgment) (citing PennhurstI, 451 U.S. at 16). Justice White also criticized
the majority for failing to "recognize the special status of [congressional] legislation enacted
pursuant to the [Equal Protection Clause]," noting that the Clause was designed specifically to
expand federal power and its ability to intrude upon state sovereignty. Id. (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment).
71. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
72. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2409-10 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment). The political-function cases recognize that state statutes excluding
certain persons from positions that "go to the heart of representative government" will be
subjected to a lesser standard of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See infra text
accompanying notes 144-49.
73. Gregory, Ill S. Ct. at 2409 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment). Until Gregory, the "political-function" exception had never been
applied outside of the alienage context in which it developed. See infra notes 136-39 and
accompanying text.
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interpreting rights created by Congress.7 4 Finally, Justice White argued
that the Court's modified application of the plain statement rule directly
contravenes the Court's decisions in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority7" and South Carolina v. Baker,7 6 in which the Court
held that protecting the states against congressional intrusion under the
Commerce Clause is left primarily to the political process. 77 He concluded that "the majority disregards those decisions in its attempt to
carve out areas of state activity that will receive special protection from
78
federal legislation.
Justice Blackmun, in a harsh dissent joined by Justice Marshall,

agreed with Justice White's conclusion that the majority's use of the
plain statement rule was unsupported, but argued that both Justice
White and the majority erred in concluding that appointed state judges
are "appointee[s] on the policymaking level."' 79 Blackmun relied heavily

on general rules of statutory construction 8' and on the legislative his74. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2409-10 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment).
75. 469 U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985). Garcia,which upheld congressional authority to impose
minimum wage requirements on municipal employees, overruled National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which denied Congress such authority. See infra notes 110-22 and
accompanying text. Then-Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in NationalLeague of
Cities and dissented in Garcia,promising a return to the NationalLeague of Cities standard as
soon as the votes were available. See infra note 122.
76. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
77. Gregory, 111 . Ct. at 2410 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment).
78. Id. (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment).
Justice White criticized the majority for not explaining the precise application of its modified
version of the plain statement rule, pointing out that "[tihe vagueness of the majority's rule
undoubtedly will lead States to assert that various federal statutes no longer apply to a wide
variety of State activities if Congress has not expressly referred to those activities in the statute." Id. (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment). Justice White added that the failure of the majority to restrict explicitly its modified version of the
plain statement rule to situations that" 'go to the heart of representative government' " may in
fact extend this rule to all state governmental activity. Id. at 2410 (White, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment) (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 647 (1973)).
79. Id. at 2414-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2415 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun reminded the majority of the
rule of statutory construction that "words grouped in a list should be given related meaning."
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990)). He
explained that when the "policymaking" exception is read in connection with the other categories of employees listed, it becomes clear that the exception should be limited to "employees
who work closely with their appointing official and who are directly accountable to that official." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also contended that if Congress intended to exclude a broad category of employees who make policy, the expansive category
would have been placed at the end of the listing of exceptions, not in the middle. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 798 (2d Cir. 1990)).
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tory l of the ADEA's policymaking language to support his conclusion
that this exception does not apply to judges.82 Blackmun reminded the
majority and Justice White that if a statutory term is ambiguous, the
court construing the statute should give deference to a reasonable interpretation of that term offered by an administrative agency responsible for

the statute.83 According to Justice Blackmun, the majority should have
given deference to the EEOC's argument that appointed judges are not
"appointee[s] on a policymaking level." 84
Although the Gregory Court's holding is in line with the decisions of
a majority of the courts that have considered the issue,8" the reasoning it
offered significantly extends the plain statement rule beyond its use in the
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments.8 6 Gregory also represents a departure from the rule announced in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,8 7 in which the Court determined that it had a very
limited role in interpreting Congress's Commerce Clause powers.88 To
understand the implications of the Court's decision, a review of the development of the plain statement rule and the Court's decision in Garcia
is necessary. First, however, the conflict between the ADEA and state
law's mandatory retirement provisions for appointed state judges war-

rants discussion.
The friction between the ADEA and state law mandatory retirement provisions for appointed state judges has recently been contested in
several state and federal courts.89 When Congress originally enacted the
81. Id. at 2416-18 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that the only indication of Congress's interpretation of the policymaking exception is a reference by Senator
Javits to members of a governor's cabinet. Id. at 2418 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see infra
note 101.
82. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2419 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at 2418 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
84. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see EEOC Opinion Letter, supranote 39, at N:1001 n.2
(finding that judges do not come within the "appointee[s] on the policymaking level"
exception).
85. Of the six courts that have addressed the issue, four held that the ADEA does not
extend protection to appointed state judges. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 604 (8th
Cir. 1990), aff'd, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (1991); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d 52, 58 (1st Cir.
1988); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1989); In re Stout, 521 Pa. 571, 589,
559 A.2d 489, 498 (1989).
86. See infra notes 125-35, 152-58 and accompanying text.
87. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
88. See infra notes 110-22 and accompanying text.
89. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 797-802 (2d Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 54-58; EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. at 158-60; Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F.
Supp. 330, 332-34 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988); Stout, 521
Pa. at 582-86, 559 A.2d at 495-98.
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ADEA in 1967, the statute prohibited discrimination against federal employees between the ages of forty and sixty-five,9" but did not apply to
state or local governments at all. Congress extended that Act to cover
state and local governments in 1974, 1 and in 1983 the Supreme Court
held that the extension of the ADEA to the states was a valid exercise of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause.9 2 In 1986 Congress's
decision to remove the upper-age limitation of the ADEA, 93 in an effort
to "eliminate mandatory retirement," 94 created discord with such restrictions in state statutes.9 5 Prior to the removal of the upper-age restriction
of sixty-five, federal and state courts uniformly upheld mandatory retirement provisions for state judges. 96 None of these state law provisions
90. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat.
602, 607 (current version codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1988)), amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 3(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978) (raising upper limit of statute's applicability to age 70), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-592, § (2)(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (1986) (eliminating upper-age

limit).
91. The ADEA was extended to cover state and local governments as part of the Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1974. See Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(1)(2), 88 Stat. 55, 74
(current version codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1988)).
92. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
93. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592,
§ 2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (eliminating upper-age limitation in 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982)).
94. H.R. REP. No. 756, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5628, 5634. In 1978 Congress had raised the upper-age limitation to age 70 for state, local,
and private employees. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189, repealedby Pub. L. No, 99-592, § 2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342,
3342 (1986) (repealing upper-age limit). These amendments had no effect on state mandatory
retirement provisions, however, as no state retirement provision mandates retirement of its
appointed state judges before the age of 70. See infra note 104.
95. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts,
858 F.2d 52, 54-57 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 158-60 (N.D. I11.
1989);
Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330, 332-34 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43
(4th Cir. 1988); In re Stout, 521 Pa. 571, 582-86, 559 A.2d 489, 495-98 (1989).
96. See Hatten v. Rains, 854 F.2d 687, 691-93 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection challenge to Texas constitutional provision requiring retirement
of elected judges at age 75), cert. denied., 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Mamed v. Thornburgh, 621
F.2d 565, 571-73 (3d Cir.) (finding Pennsylvania constitutional provisions mandating retirement of judges at age 70 valid under Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980); Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623,
627-29 (7th Cir.) (rejecting Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Illinois statute requiring retirement of elected judges at age 70), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 906 (1979); Rubino v. Ghezzi, 512
F.2d 431, 432-33 (2d Cir.) (upholding the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring
retirement of elected officials at age 70), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 891 (1975); Zielasko v. Ohio,
693 F. Supp. 577, 586-87 (N.D. Ohio 1988) (finding Ohio constitutional provision precluding
election or appointment to judicial office past age 70 valid under First and Fourteenth Amendment), aff'd, 873 F.2d 957 (6th Cir. 1989); Gondelman v. Pennsylvania, 520 Pa. 451, 465-69,
554 A.2d 896, 903-05 (upholding Pennsylvania constitutional provision requiring mandatory
retirement of judges), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 146 (1989); see Tina E. Sciocchetti, Comment,
Mandatory Retirement of Appointed State Judges-Age Discrimination?,85 Nw. U. L. R-v.
866, 866 & n.5 (1991).
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mandated retirement before the age of seventy, however.9 7
Following the removal of the upper-age limitation, judges subjected
to state law mandatory retirement provisions contended that the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution mandates the con-

clusion that the ADEA should prevail over state laws requiring retirement. 98 As long as appointed state judges are "employees" within the
definition outlined in the ADEA, the judges argued, mandatory retirement provisions could not be enforced against them. 99
Lower federal courts agreed that judges did not fall within the

ADEA's exceptions for elected officials, the personal staff of elected officials, or advisors."°° The courts split, however, on the question whether
appointed state judges are "appointee[s] on the policymaking level." 10 1
Four courts held that appointed judges engage in policymaking and
97. For a list of state statutes establishing mandatory retirement ages for judges, see infra
note 104.
98. See cases cited supra note 95.
99. See cases cited supra note 95; see also supra note 11 (listing the exceptions to the
ADEA).
100. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 797-98 (2d'Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Massachusetts,
858 F.2d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. 156, 158-59 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
101. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 798; EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 55-58;
EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. at 159-60. There is scant legislative history of§ 630(f) to aid in
interpreting the ADEA's precise definition of "appointee on the polieymaking level." Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701(f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988), however, contains
language identical to the policymaking exception found in the ADEA. Courts using legislative
history to determine the precise meaning of this exception gave substantial weight to the legislative history surrounding the Title VII provisions. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 798;
EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 55. The Supreme Court also endorsed the use of Title
VII's legislative history for the purpose of interpreting the ADEA. See Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("[The] interpretation of Title VII... applies with
equal force in the context of age discrimination...."); Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S.
750, 756 (1979) ("[S]ince the legislative history of [the ADEA] indicates that its source was
[Title VII], we may properly conclude that Congress intended that the construction of [the
ADEA] should follow that of [Title VII]." (citing Northcross v. Memphis Bd.of Edue., 412
U.S. 427, 428 (1973))); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) ("[T]he prohibitions of the
ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII."). Several commentators, in light of these
Supreme Court decisions, turned to Title VII for guidance in construing the terms of the
ADEA.See, eg., Sciocchetti, supra note 96, at 874-76; Alan L. Bushlow, Note, Mandating
Retirement of State-Appointed Judges Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act, 76
CORNELL L. Rnv. 476, 505-07 (1991).
The relevant language in Title VII was added in 1972, when the Civil Rights Act's definition of "employee" was extended to include government workers. See Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988)). Senator Ervin, who was concerned that the original definition of
employee would be too broad when applied to governmental entities, initiated most of the
debate surrounding the definition. 118 CONG. REC. 4096 (1972). Senator Ervin insisted repeatedly that the unamended definition of "employee" could be construed to cover "persons
who exercise the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the States and political subdivisions of the States." Id. at 1838. Senator Ervin proposed an amendment to ensure that the
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therefore fall within the policymaking exception,102 while two others
held the opposite. 10 3
Gregory puts to rest the issue of whether judges are "appointee[s] on
the policymaking level" and thus subject to states' mandatory retirement
provisions. Given the fact that at least thirty states currently have
mandatory retirement provisions," 4 the Court's findings that appointed
term "employee" would not include persons elected to public office or any person selected by
an elected official to advise him with respect to the powers of his office. Id. at 4096, 4483.
Senator Williams proposed to expand this exclusion even further to include the elected
official's personal staff. Id. at 4492-93. Senator Williams noted that the purpose of the exemption was to exclude governmental officials "who are chosen by the Governor or the mayor or
the county supervisor, whatever the elected official is, and who are in a close personal relationship and an immediate relationship with him. Those who are his first line advisors." Id. As a
result of Senator Williams's comments, Senator Ervin's proposed amendment was expanded to
exclude an elected official "or any person chosen by such officer to be a personal assistant, or
an immediate adviser in respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the
office." Id. at 4493. The Senate adopted the amendments, thereby excluding both personal
staff members and immediate advisors from Title VII coverage.
The pohcymaking exception appears to stem from Senator Javits's concern that the scope
of the "adviser" phrase was too broad. Id. at 4097. At Senator Javits's urging, the conference
committee on the bill agreed to replace the language of the Senate amendment with a single
"policymaker" exception and adopjed the exclusion of "appointees on the policymaking
level." See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 899, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2179-80. (The original version of the exclusion read as follows:
"[A]ppointees of such officials on a policy making level." Id. at 15, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2180.) In
defining the scope of the exclusion, the conferees explained:
It is the intention of the conferees to exempt elected officials and members of their
personal staffs, and persons appointed by such elected officials as advisors or to policymaking positions at the highest levels of the departments or agencies of State or
local governments, such as cabinet officers, and persons with comparable responsibilities at the local level. It is the conferees'] intent that this exemption shall be construed narrowly.
Id. at 15-16, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2180.
102. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598, 600-04 (8th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 111 S.Ct. 2395
(1991); EEOC v. Massachusetts, 858 F.2d at 54-57; EEOC v. Illinois, 721 F. Supp. at 159-60;
In re Stout, 521 Pa. 571, 582-86, 559 A.2d 489, 495-98 (1989).
103. See EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d at 797-802; Schlitz v. Virginia, 681 F. Supp. 330,
332-34 (E.D. Va.), rev'd on other grounds, 854 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1988).
104. Thirty states currently have either constitutional or statutory mandatory retirement
provisions. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.16 (retirement at age 70); ALASKA CONST. art.
IV, § 11 (retirement at age 70); ARIz. CONST. art. VI, § 20 (retirement at age 70); COLO.
CONST. art. VI, § 23(1) (retirement by age 72); CONN. CONST. art. V, § 6 (retirement at age
70); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 8 (retirement at age 70); LA. CONST. art. V, § 23 (retirement at age
70); MD. CONsT. art. IV, § 3 (retirement at age 70); MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. III, art. I (Articles of Amendment, art. XCVIII) (retirement at age 70); MICH. CONsT. art. VI, § 19 (no judge
elected or appointed to office after age 70); Mo. CONST. art. V, §§ 26, 27 (retirement at age 70,
legislature may raise to 76); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 78 (retirement at age 70); N.Y. CONSr. art.
VI, § 25 (retirement at age 70); N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 8 (empowering legislature to set retirement age); N.D. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 12, 12.1 (empowering legislature to set retirement); PA.
CONsr. art. V, § 16 (retirement at age 70); TEX.CONsT. art. V, § l-a (retirement at age 75);
VT. CONsT. ch. II, § 35 (retirement at age 70); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (empowering legisla-
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judges are policymaking appointees and thus are not protected by the
ADEA, and that mandatory retirement provisions for judges do not violate the federal constitution, will have a profound impact on the careers
of appointed state judges throughout the country. ' The significance of
Gregory does not lie solely in its effect on appointed state judges, however, for the Gregory Court's new rule of statutory construction also will
pose a significant threat to the balance of power between state and federal
governments.
Prior to Gregory the federal judiciary almost entirely relinquished its
role as mediator between the states and federal government in the area of
commerce. With its decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,10 6 the Supreme Court limited the federal judiciary's
ability to invalidate statutes enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause to
legislation that effectively eliminates state and local governmental functions.10 7 In Gregory, however, the Court employed the plain statement
rule to sidestep Garcia and review the ADEA, even though the ADEA
ture to set retirement age); WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a) (legislature to set age of retirement

between 70 and 75); Wis. CONST. art. VII, § 24 (retirement at age 70 unless legislature
prescribes longer term); ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-8-215 (Michie Supp. 1991) (retirement by age
70 to receive retirement benefits); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-9-70 (Michie Supp. 1991) (retirement
by age 75 to keep benefits); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 23.71 (Smith-Hurd 1990) (retirement at age 75); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-2608 (Supp. 1990) (retirement at age 70); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 490.125 (West 1991) (retirement at age 70); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-7 (West
Supp. 1991) (retirement at age 70); S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-1-1530 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)
(retirement at age 70); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-1-4.1 (1987) (retirement at age 70);
WYO. STAT. § 5-1-106 (Supp. 1991) (retirement by age 70).
105. The North Carolina Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of a
mandatory provision requiring state judges to retire at the age of 72. See Martin v. North
Carolina, 330 N.C. 412, 419, 410 S.E.2d 474, 478 (1991) (reviewing the constitutionality of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-4.20 (1989)). The North Carolina statute provides:
No justice or judge of the appellate division... may continue in office beyond the last
day of the month in which he attains his seventy-second birthday, and no judge of
the superior court or district court division... may continue in office beyond the last
day of the month in which he attains his seventieth birthday ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-4.20 (1989).

Two state appellate judges challenged the statute as unconstitutional because it limited
the petitioner's ability to hold office for the constitutionally proscribed eight-year term. Martin, 330 N.C. at 413, 410 S.E.2d at 475; see also N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (providing that
judges "shall be elected by the qualified voters and shall hold office for terms of eight years").
The supreme court upheld the mandatory retirement provision, finding that the people of
North Carolina, in amending Article IV, § 8 of the North Carolina Constitution to allow the
general assembly to prescribe maximum age limits for judges, indicated clearly their "intent to
empower the legislature to interrupt judicial terms of office with an age limit on active service." Martin, 330 N.C. at 416, 410 S.E.2d at 476; see N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
106. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
107. Id. at 546-47.
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did not threaten to eliminate any state governmental function. 10 8 By
holding that the ADEA does not apply to appointed state judges, the
Court construed the ADEA narrowly, limiting Congress's Commerce
Clause powers without directly confronting the constraints imposed by
09
Garcia.
In Garcia the Court extended the federal minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to a municipally-owned
and operated mass transit system.1 10 Garciaoverruled the Court's earlier
decision in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,111 which held that Congress lacked the authority to regulate wages of state employees, because
such action restricted a state's freedom of choice as to how to allocate
resources in traditional state and local governmental functions. 2 In
striking down the National League of Cities decision, the Court rejected
the "traditional governmental function" test 1 3 and concluded that the
judiciary should play a very limited role in determining whether state
and local governments were entitled to immunity from Commerce
Clause legislation.1 14
Garcia'srejection of the National League of Cities test marked the
end of the judiciary's role in supervising the scope of the Commerce
Clause power as it applied to state and local government activities. In a
series of cases beginning with National League of Cities, however, the
Court had developed the rule that congressional regulation of state activity would be invalid if the Court determined that the statute regulated
the "states as states"; that it addressed matters that were attributes of
state or local sovereignty; that it required state compliance with federal
legislation in a manner that directly impaired a state's ability to structure
its operations in "traditional function" areas; and that state interests outweighed federal interests.1 1 The NationalLeague of Cities Court used
108. See infra text accompanying notes 163-64.
109. See Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2403.
110. Garcia,469 U.S. at 547-55.
111. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
112. Id. at 840-52 (relying on the Tenth Amendment to find that congressional enactments
under the Commerce Clause are unconstitutional whenever they "operate to directly displace
the State's freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions").
113. Garcia,469 U.S. at 546-47.
114. Id. at 545-47.
115. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236-39 (1983) (determining the applicability of
ADEA to state and local governments); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 753-58 (1982)
(applying federal energy regulation to state public utilities); United Transp. Union v. Long
Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 682-90 (1982) (determining applicability of Railway Labor Act to
state-owned commuter railroads); NationalLeague of Cities, 426 U.S. at 840-52 (finding mini-
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this test to impose restrictions on congressional power under the Commerce Clause for the first time since 1936.116 Although later cases contributed to the development of the "traditional governmental functions"
limitation, 1 7 National League of Cities proved to be the only case in

which the Court found that federal legislation fell within this rule.
In the nine years between NationalLeague of Cities and Garcia, the
Court had three opportunities to consider the applicability of National
League of Cities."'8 The Court, however, did not find immunity from
federal legislation in any of these cases, 1 9 leaving lower courts without a

clear standard for determining when a federal law was an undue extension of Congress's Commerce Clause powers. 20 This difficulty in articulating a consistent test for determining the immunity of certain

"traditional governmental functions" contributed to the Court's holding
in Garcia that the judiciary has a limited role in determining whether
states and local governments are entitled to immunity from Commerce
Clause legislation.12 1 After Garcia,state and local governments, fearful

that federal legislation could impair state governmental functions, were
forced to look to the political process, rather than the Court, for relief

from this legislation.' 22

mum wage and overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act inapplicable to state government employees).
116. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297-99 (1936).
117. See EEOC,460 U.S. at 236-39; FERC, 456 U.S. at 753-58; United Transp. Union, 455
U.S. at 682-90.
118. See EEOC, 460 U.S. at 236-39 (determining the applicability of ADEA to state and
local governments); FERC, 456 U.S. at 753-58 (applying federal energy regulation to state
public utilities); United Transp. Union, 455 U.S. at 682-90 (determining applicability of Railway Labor Act to state-owned commuter railroads).
119. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. One explanation for the failure of the
NationalLeague of Cities doctrine is that it never commanded a solid majority of the Court.
See Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a
Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARv. L. REv. 84, 87 (1985). Justice Blackmun, who concurred in
NationalLeague of Cities, quickly changed his views and, following the decision, voted consistently with the four justices who dissented in NationalLeague of Cities. Id. These five justices
eventually comprised the Garcia majority. Id. Justice Blackmun's switch in voting effectively
reduced the proponents of NationalLeague of Cities to dissenters whenever an issue of state
immunity arose. Id. at 88.
120. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539 (1985) ("Thus far,
this Court itself has made little headway in defining the scope of the governmental functions
deemed protected under NationalLeague of Cities.").
121. Id. at 546-47.
122. Id. The Garciadecision was met with great resistance by the justices who supported
National League of Cities: Chief Justice Burger, then-Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and
Justice O'Connor, who replaced the retired Justice Stewart. See id. at 557-79 (Powell, J., dissenting); id at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 580-889 (O'Connor, 3., dissenting). In
harsh dissenting opinions by Justices Powell and O'Connor, these justices expressed grave concern over the great power given to the federal government by the Garcia decision and lamented
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In Gregory the Court relied on a modified version of the plain statement rule to avoid direct confrontation with Garcia'slimitation on judicial supervision in the area of commerce. This avoidance of Garcia is in
accordance with the basic principle that a federal court should avoid deciding a constitutional issue if possible. 123 It is far from certain, however,
that a constitutional problem would have arisen if the Court had found
that, in light of its decisions in Garcia,the ADEA applied to appointed
state judges.124 The Court must have had another reason for employing
the plain statement rule in this context. A close examination of the case
law supporting the Court's newly revised rule of statutory construction
may shed light on the rule's intended purpose.
To support the use of the plain statement rule to determine the applications of federal statutes directed to state governmental activity, the
Gregory Court called on three distinct bodies of case law. The first group
of cases concerns the Court's use of the plain statement rule in cases
involving the Eleventh Amendment. The latter two groups focused on
Congress's ability to intrude on state sovereignty through its Fourteenth
Amendment powers.
The Eleventh Amendment cases cited in Gregory required clear congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.12 5 In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 1 26 the
the reduced role of the judiciary in monitoring abuses of the federal government. See Id. at
567-72 (Powell, 3., disenting); id. at 580-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell, writing the principal dissent, relied on the FederalistPapers to establish
the limited nature of the federal government and to support the proposition that the states
should retain sovereignty over all but the "few and defined" powers specifically delegated to
the federal government. Id. at 570-72 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 17,
at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 256
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James
Madison) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961)). Justice Powell also stressed the essential role of the
Tenth Amendment in maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by the framers of
the Constitution. Id. at 570 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell scolded the majority for
making Congress the sole judge of the limits of their own power, thereby disregarding the
fundamental constitutional provision that it is the "province of the federal judiciary 'to say
what the law is."' Id. at 567 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). Justice Powell argued that such judicial acquiescence in federal
overreaching "undermines the constitutionally mandated balance of power between the States
and the Federal Government." Id. at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist wrote a one-paragraph dissent, joining in the opinions of Justices Powell and O'Connor and predicting that the principles outlined in National League of Cities
would, once again, command a majority of the Court. Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
123. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
124. See Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2410 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment).
125. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
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Court addressed the question whether the Eleventh Amendment bars
states from being sued I27 under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.128 The Court concluded that the enactment of the Rehabilitation
Act did not abrogate the states' constitutional immunity because Congress failed to make its intention to do so "unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute."12 9 Atascadero required Congress to state clearly
in the language of the statute itself its intent to override the guarantees of
the Eleventh Amendment and announced that the Court would not look
for the necessary congressional intent beyond the four corners of the
statute.130
The Gregory Court also relied on Will v. Michigan Department of
State Police, 3 ' another Eleventh Amendment case, in which it had articulated the requirements of the plain statement rule. In Will the plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was denied a promotion
because his brother was a student activist. 132 The issue before the Court3
was whether a state is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983.'1
The Court concluded that the state is not a "person" within the meaning
of section 1983, because the statute failed to state clearly Congress's intent to extend the statute to the states.13 Explaining its decision, the

Court relied on several other cases in which it had required a clear statement of congressional intention:

[I]f Congress intends to alter the "usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal Government," it must make
its intention to do so "unmistakably clear in the language of the
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is exceedingly complex and controversial. For a thorough discussion of this rich vein of constitutional
law, see JOHN V. ORTH,THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISoRY (1987).

126. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
127. Id. at 240.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
129. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242, 246.
130. Id. at 240, 242-46.
131. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
132. Id. at 60. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation ...subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
133. Will, 491 U.S. at 60.
134. Id. at 65,,
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statute." . . . Congress should make its intention "clear and
manifest" if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the
States ...... "In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation
affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement
assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to
bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial
decision." 13
As the Gregory Court recognized, the plain statement rule set forth
in Atascadero and Will simply acknowledged that states retain certain
sovereign powers with which Congress does not readily interfere and
noted that Congress must state expressly its intent to interfere with these
sovereign powers.1 36 Although these Eleventh Amendment cases spelled
out the requirements of the plain statement rule, they do little to support
Gregory's extension of this rule to the determination of whether a state
may impose a mandatory retirement age on its appointed judges. To support this leg of its analysis, the Court relied on a long line of "politicalfunction" cases recognizing a state's ability to determine the qualifications of its most important governmental officials.
The "political-function" exception relied on in Gregory was an offshoot of the Court's past analyses of the Equal Protection Clause. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to intrude upon state
authority when a state attempts to deny its people equal protection of the
laws. 3 7 Such power is not without limitation, however, and the Supreme
Court has developed two major standards of review for state action challenged as discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause: the rational
135. Id. (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971), and citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion, criticized the majority's application of the plain statement rule, cautioning that the case law upon which it relied did not "permit substitution of an
absolutist rule of statutory construction for thorough statutory analysis." Id. at 74-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed out that, in each of the cases cited by the majority, the Court did not rely solely on the language of the statute but also performed a careful
analysis of the legislative history and the purpose of the statute. Id. at 75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan conceded that Atascaderomay lend support to the majority's holding that
the congressional intent must be manifest in the language of the statute itself. Id. (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan stressed, however, that the principle of interpretation set forth in
Atascadero is limited to Eleventh Amendment cases and therefore was irrelevant to Will. Id.
at 75-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2401.
137. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); id. § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
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relation test 138 and the strict scrutiny test.139
Sugarman v. Dougall,'4 the first case to articulate the political-function exception, applied the strict scrutiny test to find that New York
could not exclude aliens from all state jobs unless the state furnished
"compelling justifications" for doing so.14 The Court's holding followed
its earlier decision in Graham v. Richardson,142 in which it had granted
aliens suspect class status and applied the strict scrutiny test to declare
unconstitutional two state welfare statutes denying benefits to
noncitizens. 143
At first glance, the Sugarman Court appeared to reinforce the use of
the strict scrutiny test to review statutes adversely affecting aliens. In
dictum, however, the Court carved out a significant exception to Graham's requirement of strict scrutiny. " This exception, known as the
"political-function" exception, acknowledges "a State's historical power

to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institu138. See, eg., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-91 (1955); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949); see also Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt:
A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1972) (outlining development of judicial scrutiny in Fourteenth Amendment cases). Under the rational relation test,
also known as "minimum scrutiny review," states may take discriminatory action for the benefit or disadvantage of certain groups as long as the discriminatory classification is rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488-91; Railway Express
Agency, 336 U.S. at 109-11. The rational relation test is the more lenient standard of review,
because statutes satisfy this test if the courts can conceive of any set of facts to justify the
statute. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961). See generallyJ. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court,the EqualProtection Clause, andthe Three Facesof Constitutional
Equality, 61 VA. L. REV.945, 950-54 (1975) (describing the Court's rational relation and strict
scrutiny tests). Courts utilizing the rational relation test rarely set aside statutory discrimination. See Gunther, supra, at 8.
139. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
343 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd.of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-70 (1966). Strict scrutiny
was first articulated by Justice Stone in his now-famous "footnote four" in United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The strict scrutiny standard of review
requires that discriminatory state action be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state
interest in order to be declared constitutional. Wilkinson, supra note 138, at 951. Courts
invoke strict scrutiny when the statute burdens a judicially recognized suspect class or impinges on an important fundamental right. Id.; see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying
text (noting that age is not a suspect class nor do judges have a fundamental right to serve as
judges).
140. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
141. Id. at 642-43. Since Sugarman, the Court rejected the strict scrutiny analysis as applied to classifications based on alienage and adopted a lesser intermediate level scrutiny. See
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-24.
142. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
143. Id. at 374-76.
144. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647-48 (dictum).
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tions, ' 145 and recognizes that the strict scrutiny test should not be used
when reviewing state statutes that exclude aliens from important governmental functions. 4 6 Instead, Sugarman implied that the rational relation test was the appropriate standard of review for state statutes that
"go to the heart of representative government."14 7
The Supreme Court gradually broadened its political-function exception, extending to the states a new way to evade restrictions imposed
upon them by congressional action. 4 The Gregory Court seized upon
this long line of political-function cases to support its conclusion that the
states' power to define the qualifications of officeholders is an important
limitation on Congress's power. By removing this political-function exception from its Fourteenth Amendment context and combining it with
the plain statement rule from the Eleventh Amendment cases, the Court
developed a new version of the plain statement rule, through which the
Court requires clear legislative intent to extend federal statutes to cover
employees in positions that "'go to the heart of representative

government.'

"149

The Gregory Court's variation of the plain statement rule did not
end with the determination of whether Congress intended to extend the
ADEA to appointed state judges under the Commerce Clause; it also
relied on the rule to determine whether Congress intended to extend the
statute to these judges pursuant to its powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 150 In so doing, the Court turned to PennhurstI,'11 which
employed the plain statement rule in the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In PennhurstI the Court applied the plain statement rule to determine whether Congress passed a provision of the Developmentally Dis145. Id. at 648 (dictum) (citing Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632-34 (1904); Boyd v.
Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892)).
146. Id. (dictum).
147. Id. at 647-48 (dictum).
148. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 444-47 (1982) (broadening exception to
include deputy probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-80 (1979) (holding
that public school teachers come within once-narrow confines of political-function exception);
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297-300 (1978) (expanding political-function exception to
include a statute excluding aliens from state police force).
149. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2401 (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647); see supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
150. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
151. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). The Court ultimately decided the Pennhurst litigation on Eleventh
Amendment grounds. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123
(1984) (PennhurstII). The Gregory Court, however, cited PennhurstI for its development of
the" 'appropriate test for determining when Congress intends to enforce' the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2405 (quoting Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 16).

1992]

AGE DISCRIMINATION

1585

abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DDA/BRA)1 2 pursuant to its
powers under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 3 The Court
found that because Fourteenth Amendment legislation makes state compliance with federal policy involuntary, and "because it often intrudes on
traditional state authority, we should not quickly attribute to Congress
an unstated intent to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment." '54 The Pennhurst I Court held that in the DDA/BRA
Congress did not state clearly its intent to intrude upon the state's au-

thority,15 5 and concluded that Congress did not intend to legislate pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 When the Court considered
Pennhurst a second time,' 57 it again stressed its reluctance to intrude on
the Eleventh Amendment's guarantee of states sovereign immunity, noting that the Court requires "an unequivocal expression of congressional
intent to 'overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several states.' ,,158
The Gregory majority relied on this new use of the plain statement
rule, which combines aspects of the plain statement rule with the political-function exception, to find that Congress, in enacting the ADEA,
provided no clear legislative intent to intrude on a state's ability to determine the qualifications of its officeholders. Gregory thus reveals a Court

willing to rely on statutory construction to check the excesses of federal
congressional powers, especially when Congress enacts a statute pursuant
to the Commerce Clause. 159 With its decision in Garcia v. San Antonio
152. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-103,
§ 201, 89 Stat. 502 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1988)).
153. Pennhurst1,451 U.S. at 15-16. The respondent, Halderman, contended that Congress
passed § 6010 pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and intended to place an obligation on the states to provide certain kinds of treatment to the disabled regardless of whether
they received federal funds. Id. at 15.
154. Id. at 16.
155. Id. at 18.
156. Id.
157. Pennhurst I, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). After finding that 42 U.S.C. § 6010 did not create
any substantive rights for the residents of Pennhurst, the PennhurstI Court remanded the case
to the court of appeals to determine if the petitioners were entitled to relief under state law, the
Constitution, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982) (amended
1984, 1986, 1991), or other provisions of the DDA/BRA. See Pennhurst1,451 U.S. at 27-3 1.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 457 U.S. 1131 (1982), to review the Third Circuit's
decision that the petitioners were entitled to relief under Pennsylvania's Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4201 (Purdon 1969). See Halderman v.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 651-56 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 465 U.S.
89 (1984).
158. PennhurstII, 465 U.S. at 99 (quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979)).
159. See Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2400 ("One can fairly dispute whether our federalist system
has been quite as successful in checking governmental abuse.., but there is no doubt about
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Metropolitan Transit Authority,"6 the Court limited its role in granting

states and local governments immunity from legislation passed pursuant
to the Commerce Clause.1 61 Through its innovative use of the plain
statement rule to review the ADEA despite the mandate of Garcia, the
Gregory Court turned to statutory construction as a means to curtail the

scope of Commerce Clause legislation directed at the states without expressly overruling Garcia. 62
According to Garcia the Court should not have addressed the ques-

tion whether the ADEA protects appointed state judges at all, because
the judicial role in constraining Commerce Clause powers is limited to

those specific instances in which Commerce Clause legislation threatens
to eliminate state and local government functions.16

Invalidating

mandatory retirement provisions for appointed state judges in no way
eliminates or even impairs the states' local functions.'6 Judicial review
of the issue, therefore, should be improper.

Realizing its limited role in reviewing Commerce Clause legislation,
the Court ignored the mandates of Garcia and used the plain statement
rule under the pretext of avoiding a potential constitutional problem.165
In doing so, however, the Court laid down a new rule directly in conflict

with Garcia1 61 that allows the examining tribunal first to determine
whether Congress intended to extend a statute's protections to state government officials, and whether that intent is clearly stated, before turning

the issue over to the political process. If, as in Gregory, the Court deterthe design. If this 'double security' is to be effective, there must be a proper balance between
the States and the Federal Government.").
160. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
161. See supra notes 106-22 and accompanying text.
162. The Rehnquist Court's growing resistance to federal legislation affecting state governments may stem from changes in the Court's membership since it decided Garcia in 1985.
Since that time, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined the Court, following the retirements of then-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Brennan. With the retirement of
Justice Brennan, one of the five members composing the Garcia majority, the precedential
value of Garcia grew doubtful. In Gregory each new member of the Court joined with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, the only remaining proponents of NationalLeague of
Cities,see supra note 122, to form the Gregory majority. See Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2398. Since
Gregory, Justice Marshall, another member of the Garcia majority, has also retired, and it is
unclear how his replacement, Justice Thomas, will vote on this issue. Nevertheless, by effectively reducing the Garcia majority to a minority, the Gregory decision may be the first in a
series of cases sounding the death knell for Garcia.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
164. See Brian M. Welch, Note, MandatoryRetirement ofAppointed State Judges: Balancing State and FederalInterests, 25 VAL. U. L. Rtv. 125, 148, 149 n.162 (1990).
165. See Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2405-06.
166. See supra notes 106-22 and accompanying text.
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mines that the requisite congressional intent is missing, the scope of the
legislation will be narrowed.
The Gregory Court's use of the plain statement rule represents a significant departure from ordinary rules of statutory construction. When a
statute's language is ambiguous, common principles of statutory construction demand review of the legislative history and the purpose of the
statute.16 7 Despite the Gregory Court's acknowledgment that the language of the ADEA is ambiguous, the majority never mentioned the legGregory,
islative history nor the purpose of the ADEA statute.'
therefore, indicates that the Court's willingness to consider legislative
history to determine the intended reaches of federal statutes is increasingly questionable.
Traditionally, courts have looked to the legislative history both to
determine the meaning of ambiguous phrases and to confirm or rebut the
plain meaning of clear statutory language. 169 Recent cases suggest that
the Court is shifting away from a review of the legislative history when
the statute is clear, preferring instead to rely on the statute's language to
determine its meaning. 170 Gregory reflects a further move away from the
traditional approach, however, because the Court declined to review the
available legislative history even though it found the statutory language
ambiguous. 171
As a consequence of the Court's failure to examine the legislative
history, inconsistencies emerge between the legislative history and the
Court's conclusion. The Court did not address Congress's expressed intention that the ADEA should broadly prohibit age discrimination in the
workplace and that the exceptions it enumerated should be narrowly
construed.17 2 By avoiding the ADEA's available legislative history, the
Court also dismissed the fact that, besides Senator Sam J. Ervin's initial
observation that the statute's original definition of "employee" included
elected judges, the judiciary was not mentioned in any subsequent con167. See 2A

NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§§ 45.09,

48.01-.20 (5th ed. 1992).

168. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
169. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 626
(1990).
170. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981) (quoting Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826
(1980).
171. See Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2406. Prior to Gregory, the Court repeatedly reviewed the
legislative history when it found the statutory language to be ambiguous. See Oklahoma v.
New Mexico, 111 S. Ct. 2281, 2290 (1991); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,
511 (1989); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565-67 (1988); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 866,
892-96 (1984).
172. Cf. supra note 101 (discussing legislative history of the ADEA).
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gressional debate. 73 Most important, the Court disregarded the fact that
Senator Ervin, the very legislator who formulated the ADEA's policymaker exception, did not view policymaking as a proper judicial
function.

74

The majority's failure to refer to the ADEA's legislative history suggests that Congress may no longer rely on its intent that its exclusions be
narrowly drawn without risk that the Court will find the exclusions ambiguous and exclude persons entitled to coverage. Instead, to ensure that
all who are entitled to do so receive protection, Congress must spell out
clearly each and every beneficiary in the statute itself. If the statute is
intended to extend to many governmental employees, this burden may be
great.
Legislative history proved to be only one source of statutory construction neglected by the Gregory Court, however. The majority also
ignored the EEOC's ruling that appointed state judges are protected by
the ADEA. 175 According to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,176 a court must accept any construction of statutory terms offered by the responsible agency so long as the agency interpretation is reasonable and Congress has "not directly addressed the
precise question at issue."' 177 The Gregory Court acknowledged that the
statute was "at least ambiguous" as to whether Congress intended to extend the ADEA to appointed state judges. 7 ' The Court, therefore,
should not "substitute its own construction of [the ADEA] for a reasonable interpretation made by [the EEOC]. 17 9 Gregory nonetheless
adopted a judicial interpretation in direct conflict with the opinion offered by the EEOC 80 without even discussing the reasonableness of the
EEOC interpretation. 1 ' Congress's future ability to rely on an administrative agency's interpretation is, therefore, uncertain.
The Court's use of statutory construction to interpret a statute in a
173. Cf. id. (discussing Senator Ervin's comments).
174. See ERVIN & CLARK, supra note 39, at 8.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
176. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
177. Id. at 842-43.
178. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
179. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
180. See EEOC Opinion Letter, supra note 39, at N:1001 n.2 (finding that judges are not
poilcymakers and are therefore protected by the ADEA).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84. This refusal even to consider the agency's
interpretation is remarkable given Justice Scalia's recent praise of Chevron. See Antonin
Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512.
In his article Justice Scalia described Chevron as "a highly important decision-perhaps the
most important in the field of administrative law since Vermont Yankee NuclearPower Corp. v.
NRDC." Id.
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manner inconsistent with congressional intent is not confined to Gregory.
In fact, Gregory may well reflect a trend, especially in civil rights cases, in
which the Court employs a "plain meaning" form of statutory interpretation to construe a statute more narrowly than Congress intended.18 2 The
Court's variation of the plain statement rule to contravene its earlier decision in Garcia and to bypass ordinary rules of statutory construction
may represent its strongest statement that it will apply its interpretative
tools to check federal congressional powers to state and local
governments.
The Court's willingness to construe federal statutes affecting state
and local government officials narrowly is evident in such cases as Atascadero and Will. In these cases, the Supreme Court limited Congress's
ability to intrude on the states' sovereign immunity by requiring clearly
expressed legislative intent before a particular federal statute will be applied to the states."8 3 The Gregory Court takes this requirement even
further now requiring a clear expression of legislative intent not only to
determine whether the statute applies to the states, but also to determine
to whom the statute applies. 184 This requirement gives the states considerable leeway to assert that Congress did not intend federal legislation to
apply to their activities.
After Gregory, the Court's novel use of the plain statement rule also
becomes the appropriate test for determining whether Congress intended
to extend the Fourteenth Amendment's protection to particular state officials. 8 5 Using the plain statement rule in this context represents a
broadening of the plain statement rule announced in earlier Fourteenth
Amendment cases. Prior to Gregory the Court had invoked the plain
statement rule only to determine whether Congress intended to enact a
statute under the Fourteenth Amendment.18 6 In refusing to find Fourteenth Amendment protection for judges because of ambiguity in the
ADEA statute, the Gregory Court greatly extended the plain statement
rule. Now, even when Congress has stated clearly its intent to act pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, it still must state expressly how the
182. See Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rightsand the Politics ofStatutory Interpretation,62

U. COLO. L. REv. 37, 38 (1991) (noting that the Supreme Court consistently cites the "plain
meaning" of statutes to construe civil rights statutes more narrowly than Congress intended);
Charles S. Ralston, Court vs. Congress: JudicialInterpretation of The Civil Rights Acts and
CongressionalResponse, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 205, 205-06 (1990) (analyzing a "recurring
pattern" in which the Supreme Court restrictively interprets civil rights statutes, forcing Congress to amend or enact new laws to correct the Court's interpretations).
183. See supra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
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particular statute is to be applied. If Congress fails to meet this burden,
it will be forced to amend or enact new laws to correct the Court's inter187
pretation of its statutes.
To support its extension of the plain statement rule, the Gregory
Court relied on its well-developed political-function exception. By combining this exception with its earlier plain statement rule cases, however,
the Court extended this exception far beyond the alienage context in
which it developed.
Before Gregory, the political-function exception only established
that the rational relation test should be applied to state statutes excluding
aliens from those governmental positions that "go to the heart of representative government." ' 8 8 Gregory now takes this exception from the
alienage context and combines it with the Court's plain statement cases
to require a clear expression of legislative intent before federal statutes
will be applied to all employees in state or local government. The Court
did not explain how cases limiting judicially created scrutiny may be relied upon to restrain Congress's legislative authority, nor did the Court
explain its rationale for combining this exception with its prior plain
statement rule cases to develop such a rule. Most importantly, however,
the Court failed to limit Gregory's rule of statutory construction to situations that "'go to the heart of representative government,'" as it did
when it first articulated the political-function exception. 189 This leaves
lower courts unsure of the limitations they should place on the new use
of the plain statement rule. This absence of clear limitation on the rule
allows states to assert that the political-function restriction on congres90
sional authority extends to all state governmental activity.1
In Gregory the Court forced Congress to specify with clarity the precise application of statutes within the statutes themselves. 91 The Court
has never subjected Congress to such a strict requirement, and the Court
offered no rationale for its departure from established precedent in developing this rule. Nevertheless, the Court created this unprecedented use
of the plain statement rule to avoid legislative history and the severe limitations Garcia placed upon its ability to review the ADEA. Thus, the
Court sent a strong message to Congress that it takes state sovereignty
seriously and established itself as a forum growing increasingly hostile to
187. See supra note 182.
188. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). For a discussion of pre.Gregory applications of the political-function test, see supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
189. See Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2409-10 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in judgment) (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647).
190. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
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congressional regulation of state governmental functions, particularly in
the area of commerce. Indeed, Gregory may represent an attempt by the
Rehnquist Court to return to National League of Cities, which allowed
the Court to construe federal statutes affecting traditional state governmental functions.19 Given Chief Justice Rehnquist's promise to return
to NationalLeague of Cities as soon as the votes were available, this is
not surprising.

193

The Court, in altering the plain statement rule without expressly
overruling Garcia, left many unanswered questions about the precise application of the rule. Justice White offered an apt description of the confusion the Court's new rule creates:
This majority's approach is... unsound because it will serve
only to confuse the law. First, the majority fails to explain the
scope of its rule. Is the rule limited to federal regulation of the
qualifications of state officials? Or does it apply more broadly
to the regulation of any "state governmental functions"? Second, the majority does not explain its requirement that Congress' intent to regulate a particular state activity be "plain to
anyone reading [the federal statute]." Does that mean that it is
now improper to look to the purpose or history of a federal
the scope of the statute's limitations on
statute in determining
19 4
state activities?
By leaving so many issues unresolved, Gregory undermines the Court's
once-clear rule in Garciathat the judiciary's role in reviewing Commerce
Clause legislation is limited, and once again leaves the lower federal
courts without a clear standard for examining federal legislation affecting
a state's traditional governmental functions.19 5
DEANNA

L. RUDDOCK

192. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 122.
194. Gregory, III S. Ct. at 2410 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
195. Cf. supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties faced by lower
federal courts prior to Garcia).

